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L. 1162. But when, as in the principal case, the only question raised before the commission is as to the constitutionality of a statute which it is enforcing, the action of the commission is purely judicial in its nature. Consequently an appearance before the commission on such a matter would be equivalent to going into a state court, and under the ordinary doctrines of comity the federal court would then properly refuse to entertain the petition until the remedies afforded by the state courts had been exhausted. *Peck v. Jenness*, 7 How. 612; see note to *Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati*, 22 C. C. A. 359. The apparent inconsistency involved in denying that the commission is a court within the Judicial Code, and at the same time recognizing its judicial character for the purposes of comity when it passes on the validity of a statute, should offend no one. The difficulty is not substantial, and results merely from paucity of legal terminology.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS — CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY — CONTRACT TO WAIVE STATUTORY ABOLITION OF THE FELLOW SERVANT RULE. — State statutes abolished the fellow servant rule as applied to railroad employees, and substituted a rule of comparative negligence for the defense of contributory negligence. Miss. LAWS, 1908, c. 194; Miss. LAWS, 1910, c. 135. In his contract of employment the plaintiff assumed the risk of all injuries arising out of his own or a fellow servant's negligence. He was injured through his own negligence combined with that of a fellow employee. *Held*, that he may recover. *Illinois Central R. Co. v. Harris*, 67 So. 54 (Miss.).

A contract by which an employer is absolved from liability for negligent injury to his employees is generally held void as against public policy. *Little Rock & F. S. Ry. Co. v. Eubanks*, 48 Ark. 460, 3 S. W. 808; *Consolidated Coal Co. v. Lundak*, 196 Ill. 594, 63 N. E. 1079; *contra, Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Bishop*, 50 Ga. 465. In England, however, a contract waiving the statutory abolition of the fellow servant rule is valid. *Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley*, 9 Q. B. D. 357. But in this country the contrary view prevails. *Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fronk*, 74 Kan. 519, 87 Pac. 698; *Tarbell v. Rutland R. Co.*, 73 Vt. 347, 51 Atl. 6. Similarly where the vice-principal doctrine is adopted, a contract waiving recovery for injury by a negligent vice-principal is invalid. *Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Spangler*, 44 Oh. St. 471, 8 N. E. 467; *cf. Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens*, 20 Oh. 415. In general, wherever a statute regulating the relation of master and servant is reinforced by criminal penalties, a private agreement to waive its benefits would be clearly invalid. *Ten-Hour Law for Street Ry. Corporations*, 24 R. I. 603, 54 Atl. 602; *Short v. Bullion-Beck & Champion Mining Co.*, 20 Utah 20, 57 Pac. 720. See *Holden v. Hardy*, 169 U. S. 366, 397; 26 HARV. L. REV. 262. On the other hand, a contract to waive the benefits of a civil statute designed to protect only the parties to the contract will be enforced; but if the purpose of the statute was to benefit the public generally the waiver will be invalid. The view of the principal case that it is against the policy of the statute to allow it to be waived seems sound, and in accord with the principles usually followed in this country.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS — CONTRACTS COLLATERALLY RELATED TO SOMETHING ILLEGAL OR IMMORAL — ACTION BY MONOPOLY ON CONTRACT LEGAL IN ITSELF. — In an action to recover the price of goods sold to the defendant, the latter alleged as a defense that the plaintiff was an illegal monopoly of all the glucose manufacturers in the United States; and that for the purpose of perpetuating its control of the market the plaintiff had devised a profit-sharing scheme whereby rebates were paid to all purchasers provided that during the year last preceding they had dealt only with the plaintiff; and that each contract denied the right of the purchaser to resell. *Held*, that the answer alleged no defense.